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Σας παραθέτω το σχετικό απόσπασμα:
"When rent-seeking contests have small numbers of participants, behavior is
strategic, as in the prisoners’ dilemma: the resources used in rent seeking by one
rent seeker depend on the resources that others use. The Nash equilibrium of a
rent-seeking contest depends on the rule or “contest-success function” that identifies
the winner of the contest. Two basic rules are (1) resources used determine
the probability of winning, and (2) the rent seeker assigning the most resources to
the contest wins with certainty. In the first case, investing in rent seeking is viewed
as buying lottery tickets with a rent seeker’s probability of winning increasing
with the number of lottery tickets bought. In the second case the rent-seeking
contest is viewed as equivalent to an auction in which all contenders lose their
bids whether or not they win the auction (which is known as an all-pay
auction)."
Ορισμός υπάρχει και εδώ:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-pay_auction
Ευχαριστώ και πάλι.
"When rent-seeking contests have small numbers of participants, behavior is
strategic, as in the prisoners’ dilemma: the resources used in rent seeking by one
rent seeker depend on the resources that others use. The Nash equilibrium of a
rent-seeking contest depends on the rule or “contest-success function” that identifies
the winner of the contest. Two basic rules are (1) resources used determine
the probability of winning, and (2) the rent seeker assigning the most resources to
the contest wins with certainty. In the first case, investing in rent seeking is viewed
as buying lottery tickets with a rent seeker’s probability of winning increasing
with the number of lottery tickets bought. In the second case the rent-seeking
contest is viewed as equivalent to an auction in which all contenders lose their
bids whether or not they win the auction (which is known as an all-pay
auction)."
Ορισμός υπάρχει και εδώ:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All-pay_auction
Ευχαριστώ και πάλι.