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Ξεκινάει η δίκη του εικονιζόμενου στην αβατάρα μου (έγινε πατέρας προ ημερών):
[τα παχιά δικά μου]
Trial Begins Next Week for Human Rights Activist in China
By CHRIS BUCKLEY
(ΝΥΤ)
HONG KONG — One of China’s most prominent human rights activists, Xu Zhiyong, will stand trial next week and believes that his conviction is all but certain, although he will fight the charges, his lawyer said Friday.
The lawyer, Zhang Qingfang, said that after a day of unsuccessfully trying to convince court officials in Beijing that there were major procedural flaws in the case, the officials handed him a notice that Mr. Xu would face trial on Wednesday for “assembling a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.” If convicted, Mr. Xu could spend up to five years in prison, Mr. Zhang said in a telephone interview.
“I also visited Xu during the day, and he was very normal and steady,” Mr. Zhang said. “But he sees that this trial is basically just going through the motions. We can foresee the outcome already.”
Another defense lawyer for Mr. Xu, Yang Jinzhu, who also went to the court meeting, confirmed the trial date in a brief telephone interview.
The trial will be a show of the determination of President Xi Jinping and other Communist Party leaders to extinguish any organized opposition, however mild, emerging to challenge their control, Mr. Xu’s supporters have said.
China's courts are controlled by the Communist Party and rarely find defendants innocent, especially in politically contentious cases like this one. Mr. Xu will nonetheless contest the charges, Mr. Zhang said.
“All the prosecution’s witness testimony will probably be given in writing, with none of the witnesses called to the courtroom, and Xu Zhiyong has said he will stay silent for that phase, and we will respect his wishes,” Mr. Zhang said. “But in the defense phase, it’s likely that we’ll vigorously reject the whole basis of the charges, and Mr. Xu hasn’t excluded also making his own statement then.”
Over the past decade, Mr. Xu, 40, has become one of China’s best-known rights advocates, campaigning against, among other things, arbitrary detention by the police, discriminatory barriers against rural schoolchildren and “black jails” used to secretly detain aggrieved citizens who travel to Beijing to complain to officials. He taught law at the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications.
He also became the most prominent advocate of the New Citizens Movement, which won widespread attention early last year with small protests across the country demanding that Communist Party officials disclose their wealth, release political prisoners and give people more say in government. Mr. Xu was detained by the police in July and had been under informal house arrest since April.
After Mr. Xi assumed leadership of the party in November 2012, he promised greater accountability and a fairer legal system. But Mr. Xi and other leaders have also emphasized that they wanted to bolster, not weaken, controls over the Internet, ideology and social unrest — and the efforts to stamp out the New Citizens Movement have reflected that determination.
“They believe there’s a crisis of control and civil forces are constantly strengthening, so finally we have this intense contention,” Teng Biao, a Chinese legal scholar who has long been friends with Mr. Xu, said in an interview. “It’s very difficult for a system like this to abandon power of its own accord.”
Altogether, about 18 participants in the New Citizens Movement were arrested last year, although a few were released, according to Maya Wang, a researcher in Hong Kong for Human Rights Watch. Three stood trial in Jiangxi Province in southeast China late last year, and are awaiting verdicts.
The prosecutors’ indictment against Mr. Xu, issued last month, dwelled on allegations that he had orchestrated protests in Beijing, including a gathering by people calling for equal schooling opportunities for rural and urban children.
Only a handful of Mr. Xu’s relatives will be allowed in the courtroom, Mr. Zhang said. Mr. Xu’s wife gave birth to their first child, a daughter, on Monday.
[τα παχιά δικά μου]
Trial Begins Next Week for Human Rights Activist in China
By CHRIS BUCKLEY
(ΝΥΤ)
HONG KONG — One of China’s most prominent human rights activists, Xu Zhiyong, will stand trial next week and believes that his conviction is all but certain, although he will fight the charges, his lawyer said Friday.
The lawyer, Zhang Qingfang, said that after a day of unsuccessfully trying to convince court officials in Beijing that there were major procedural flaws in the case, the officials handed him a notice that Mr. Xu would face trial on Wednesday for “assembling a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.” If convicted, Mr. Xu could spend up to five years in prison, Mr. Zhang said in a telephone interview.
“I also visited Xu during the day, and he was very normal and steady,” Mr. Zhang said. “But he sees that this trial is basically just going through the motions. We can foresee the outcome already.”
Another defense lawyer for Mr. Xu, Yang Jinzhu, who also went to the court meeting, confirmed the trial date in a brief telephone interview.
The trial will be a show of the determination of President Xi Jinping and other Communist Party leaders to extinguish any organized opposition, however mild, emerging to challenge their control, Mr. Xu’s supporters have said.
China's courts are controlled by the Communist Party and rarely find defendants innocent, especially in politically contentious cases like this one. Mr. Xu will nonetheless contest the charges, Mr. Zhang said.
“All the prosecution’s witness testimony will probably be given in writing, with none of the witnesses called to the courtroom, and Xu Zhiyong has said he will stay silent for that phase, and we will respect his wishes,” Mr. Zhang said. “But in the defense phase, it’s likely that we’ll vigorously reject the whole basis of the charges, and Mr. Xu hasn’t excluded also making his own statement then.”
Over the past decade, Mr. Xu, 40, has become one of China’s best-known rights advocates, campaigning against, among other things, arbitrary detention by the police, discriminatory barriers against rural schoolchildren and “black jails” used to secretly detain aggrieved citizens who travel to Beijing to complain to officials. He taught law at the Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications.
He also became the most prominent advocate of the New Citizens Movement, which won widespread attention early last year with small protests across the country demanding that Communist Party officials disclose their wealth, release political prisoners and give people more say in government. Mr. Xu was detained by the police in July and had been under informal house arrest since April.
After Mr. Xi assumed leadership of the party in November 2012, he promised greater accountability and a fairer legal system. But Mr. Xi and other leaders have also emphasized that they wanted to bolster, not weaken, controls over the Internet, ideology and social unrest — and the efforts to stamp out the New Citizens Movement have reflected that determination.
“They believe there’s a crisis of control and civil forces are constantly strengthening, so finally we have this intense contention,” Teng Biao, a Chinese legal scholar who has long been friends with Mr. Xu, said in an interview. “It’s very difficult for a system like this to abandon power of its own accord.”
Altogether, about 18 participants in the New Citizens Movement were arrested last year, although a few were released, according to Maya Wang, a researcher in Hong Kong for Human Rights Watch. Three stood trial in Jiangxi Province in southeast China late last year, and are awaiting verdicts.
The prosecutors’ indictment against Mr. Xu, issued last month, dwelled on allegations that he had orchestrated protests in Beijing, including a gathering by people calling for equal schooling opportunities for rural and urban children.
Only a handful of Mr. Xu’s relatives will be allowed in the courtroom, Mr. Zhang said. Mr. Xu’s wife gave birth to their first child, a daughter, on Monday.
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China Unveils New Native Operating System
By BREE FENG
(Sinosphere, NYT)
Chinese researchers have developed a new mobile operating system intended to break the dominance in China of systems produced by Google, Apple and Microsoft.
At a ceremony in Beijing on Wednesday, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Shanghai-based Liantong Network Communications Technology unveiled the domestically produced China Operating System, or COS, designed for use on many devices including smartphones and personal computers.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences called COS a strategic product for national security, urgently needed following revelations regarding United States surveillance and Microsoft Windows ending further support of its XP system, the state-run Global Times newspaper reported.
The COS is “completely” independently developed, from the basic coding to the user interface, said an article posted on the Chinese Academy of Sciences website.
It said existing open-source operating systems pose security risks, and foreign-made systems have “acclimatization” difficulties in China, problems that COS addresses.
Li Mingshu, director of the Institute of Software at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said Wednesday that the researchers intend to continue making improvements to COS and match or even overtake other systems that dominate the Chinese market today.
Chen Feili, the deputy general manager of Liantong Network Communications Technology, told C114, a Chinese communications news website, that the Chinese telecom giants China Mobile and China Telecom have been testing phones based on COS over the past three months.
There’s already “a certain consensus” about bringing a commercial version of COS to market, Mr. Chen said. He said that discussions about business models and compatibility issues were already underway.
Though he declined to mention the names of the manufacturers, Mr. Chen said that there are already four smartphone models that use COS.
COS can run Java applications, and supports HTML 5 web applications and games, the C114 article said. It is currently compatible with over 100,000 applications, it said.
The state broadcaster CCTV showed COS in action on Thursday, in a news segment in which a reporter demonstrated that people could play popular games, including “Cut the Rope” and “Angry Birds” on an unbranded black mobile phone.
Mr. Chen said he has high ambitions for COS, saying the “ultimate goal” is to make it the main operating system in China. This is a lofty goal. According to the American market researcher International Data Corporation, China’s smartphone market is dominated by Android with nearly 90 percent of phones in 2013 running on the Google system.
COS is not the only domestically produced operating system to make headlines recently. On Jan. 9, the Chinese technology company Coship Electronics announced that it had produced the country’s first smartphone operating system with independent intellectual property rights. The company’s chairman, Yuan Ming, said that the system, called 960 OS, took 15 years to develop.
How long COS was under development and the costs of research and development were not disclosed.
Although the state-run People’s Daily praised COS on Thursday as the “realization of the Chinese Dream in the field of operating systems,” the online reaction from Chinese consumers was more scathing.
“Its full name should be Copy Other System,” said one user with the handle “byxu,” in one of the most upvoted comments on Sina weibo. “It’s not open source because they’re terrified that others will see that the source code is the same as Android, and accuse them of cheating the government out of money.”
By BREE FENG
(Sinosphere, NYT)
Chinese researchers have developed a new mobile operating system intended to break the dominance in China of systems produced by Google, Apple and Microsoft.
At a ceremony in Beijing on Wednesday, the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Shanghai-based Liantong Network Communications Technology unveiled the domestically produced China Operating System, or COS, designed for use on many devices including smartphones and personal computers.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences called COS a strategic product for national security, urgently needed following revelations regarding United States surveillance and Microsoft Windows ending further support of its XP system, the state-run Global Times newspaper reported.
The COS is “completely” independently developed, from the basic coding to the user interface, said an article posted on the Chinese Academy of Sciences website.
It said existing open-source operating systems pose security risks, and foreign-made systems have “acclimatization” difficulties in China, problems that COS addresses.
Li Mingshu, director of the Institute of Software at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, said Wednesday that the researchers intend to continue making improvements to COS and match or even overtake other systems that dominate the Chinese market today.
Chen Feili, the deputy general manager of Liantong Network Communications Technology, told C114, a Chinese communications news website, that the Chinese telecom giants China Mobile and China Telecom have been testing phones based on COS over the past three months.
There’s already “a certain consensus” about bringing a commercial version of COS to market, Mr. Chen said. He said that discussions about business models and compatibility issues were already underway.
Though he declined to mention the names of the manufacturers, Mr. Chen said that there are already four smartphone models that use COS.
COS can run Java applications, and supports HTML 5 web applications and games, the C114 article said. It is currently compatible with over 100,000 applications, it said.
The state broadcaster CCTV showed COS in action on Thursday, in a news segment in which a reporter demonstrated that people could play popular games, including “Cut the Rope” and “Angry Birds” on an unbranded black mobile phone.
Mr. Chen said he has high ambitions for COS, saying the “ultimate goal” is to make it the main operating system in China. This is a lofty goal. According to the American market researcher International Data Corporation, China’s smartphone market is dominated by Android with nearly 90 percent of phones in 2013 running on the Google system.
COS is not the only domestically produced operating system to make headlines recently. On Jan. 9, the Chinese technology company Coship Electronics announced that it had produced the country’s first smartphone operating system with independent intellectual property rights. The company’s chairman, Yuan Ming, said that the system, called 960 OS, took 15 years to develop.
How long COS was under development and the costs of research and development were not disclosed.
Although the state-run People’s Daily praised COS on Thursday as the “realization of the Chinese Dream in the field of operating systems,” the online reaction from Chinese consumers was more scathing.
“Its full name should be Copy Other System,” said one user with the handle “byxu,” in one of the most upvoted comments on Sina weibo. “It’s not open source because they’re terrified that others will see that the source code is the same as Android, and accuse them of cheating the government out of money.”
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bernardina
Moderator
Τα σχόλια από κάτω είναι θησαυρός! [δυστυχώς η πραγματικότητα που διηγείται το κόμιξ μόνο για γέλια δεν είναι].
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Μάχη συμβόλων στη σκιά των επιδεινωνόμενων σχέσεων Ν. Κορέας-Κίνας-Ιαπωνίας. Ο Γιαπωνέζος πρωθυπουργός πηγαίνει και αποτίει φόρο τιμής στους εγκληματίες πολέμου του ΒΠΠ, οι Κινέζοι τώρα έφτιαξαν μνημείο και έκθεση για έναν Κορεάτη που είχε σκοτώσει τον 4 φορές πρωθυπουργό της Ιαπωνίας Ίτο Χιρομπούμι (επώνυμο-όνομα). (Voice of America)
TOKYO — Japan on Monday protested against a Chinese memorial to a Korean who assassinated a Japanese official over a century ago, branding him a terrorist and saying the move did not help repair deteriorating ties.
China's ties with Japan have long been colored by what Beijing considers Tokyo's failure to atone for its brutal occupation of parts of the country and what it sees as whitewashing of atrocities in school textbooks.
The memorial in question honors Ahn Jung-geun, who in 1909 killed Hirobumi Ito, a former top Japanese official in Korea, which at that time was occupied by Japan.
Ito was killed in the northeastern Chinese city of Harbin, the site of the memorial. Ahn was convicted and executed in 1910.
Japanese chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga told a news conference on Monday that Japan would protest the move through diplomatic channels.
“The coordinated move by China and South Korea based on a one-sided view [of history] is not conducive to building peace and stability,” in East Asia, Suga said. “The move is truly regrettable as we had made our stance and our concerns clear to the Chinese and South Korean governments.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Ahn was well respected in China and that it was totally proper to set up a memorial.
“We cannot accept this so-called protest,” Hong told a daily news briefing. “We demand Japan earnestly face up to history and reflect on it.”
Ahn is seen in Korea as a symbol of the fight against Japanese colonial rule. Ito served four terms as Japanese prime minister and is viewed as a key architect of its first constitution.
China's ties with Japan have deteriorated over the last year due to a row over a chain of disputed islands in the East China Sea, China's setting up of an air defense identification zone and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are honored along with war dead.
Both China and Korea suffered under Japanese rule, with parts of China occupied in the 1930s and Korea colonized from 1910 to 1945.
TOKYO — Japan on Monday protested against a Chinese memorial to a Korean who assassinated a Japanese official over a century ago, branding him a terrorist and saying the move did not help repair deteriorating ties.
China's ties with Japan have long been colored by what Beijing considers Tokyo's failure to atone for its brutal occupation of parts of the country and what it sees as whitewashing of atrocities in school textbooks.
The memorial in question honors Ahn Jung-geun, who in 1909 killed Hirobumi Ito, a former top Japanese official in Korea, which at that time was occupied by Japan.
Ito was killed in the northeastern Chinese city of Harbin, the site of the memorial. Ahn was convicted and executed in 1910.
Japanese chief cabinet secretary Yoshihide Suga told a news conference on Monday that Japan would protest the move through diplomatic channels.
“The coordinated move by China and South Korea based on a one-sided view [of history] is not conducive to building peace and stability,” in East Asia, Suga said. “The move is truly regrettable as we had made our stance and our concerns clear to the Chinese and South Korean governments.”
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei said Ahn was well respected in China and that it was totally proper to set up a memorial.
“We cannot accept this so-called protest,” Hong told a daily news briefing. “We demand Japan earnestly face up to history and reflect on it.”
Ahn is seen in Korea as a symbol of the fight against Japanese colonial rule. Ito served four terms as Japanese prime minister and is viewed as a key architect of its first constitution.
China's ties with Japan have deteriorated over the last year due to a row over a chain of disputed islands in the East China Sea, China's setting up of an air defense identification zone and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where war criminals are honored along with war dead.
Both China and Korea suffered under Japanese rule, with parts of China occupied in the 1930s and Korea colonized from 1910 to 1945.
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Leaked Records Reveal Offshore Holdings of China’s Elite
(ICIJ)
(...)
The confidential files include details of a real estate company co-owned by current President Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law and British Virgin Islands companies set up by former Premier Wen Jiabao’s son and also by his son-in-law.
Nearly 22,000 offshore clients with addresses in mainland China and Hong Kong appear in the files obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Among them are some of China’s most powerful men and women — including at least 15 of China’s richest, members of the National People’s Congress and executives from state-owned companies entangled in corruption scandals.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, UBS and other Western banks and accounting firms play a key role as middlemen in helping Chinese clients set up trusts and companies in the British Virgin Islands, Samoa and other offshore centers usually associated with hidden wealth, the records show. For instance, Swiss financial giant Credit Suisse helped Wen Jiabao’s son create his BVI company while his father was leading the country.
(...)
In November, a mainland Chinese news organization that was working with ICIJ to analyze the offshore data withdrew from the reporting partnership, explaining that authorities had warned it not to publish anything about the material.
ICIJ is keeping the identity of the news outlet confidential to protect journalists from government retaliation. Other partners in the investigation include the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao, the Taiwanese magazine CommonWealth and the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung.
The ICIJ team spent months sifting through the files and the leaked lists of offshore users. In most cases, names were registered in Romanized form, not Chinese characters, making matching extremely difficult. Many offshore users had provided a passport as well as an address when they set up their companies, which made it possible to confirm identities in many but not all cases. Some suspected princelings and officials in the files could not be confirmed and have not been included in this story.
Along with the China and Hong Kong names, ICIJ’s files also include the names of roughly 16,000 offshore clients from Taiwan. ICIJ will continue to publish stories with its partners in the next few days and will release the Greater China names on its Offshore Leaks Database on Jan. 23.
(...)
Κάντε μια έρευνα και για τους δικούς μας, βρε παιδιά, γιατί αν περιμένουμε από την ελληνική Δικαιοσύνη...
(ICIJ)
(...)
The confidential files include details of a real estate company co-owned by current President Xi Jinping’s brother-in-law and British Virgin Islands companies set up by former Premier Wen Jiabao’s son and also by his son-in-law.
Nearly 22,000 offshore clients with addresses in mainland China and Hong Kong appear in the files obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists. Among them are some of China’s most powerful men and women — including at least 15 of China’s richest, members of the National People’s Congress and executives from state-owned companies entangled in corruption scandals.
PricewaterhouseCoopers, UBS and other Western banks and accounting firms play a key role as middlemen in helping Chinese clients set up trusts and companies in the British Virgin Islands, Samoa and other offshore centers usually associated with hidden wealth, the records show. For instance, Swiss financial giant Credit Suisse helped Wen Jiabao’s son create his BVI company while his father was leading the country.
(...)
In November, a mainland Chinese news organization that was working with ICIJ to analyze the offshore data withdrew from the reporting partnership, explaining that authorities had warned it not to publish anything about the material.
ICIJ is keeping the identity of the news outlet confidential to protect journalists from government retaliation. Other partners in the investigation include the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao, the Taiwanese magazine CommonWealth and the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung.
The ICIJ team spent months sifting through the files and the leaked lists of offshore users. In most cases, names were registered in Romanized form, not Chinese characters, making matching extremely difficult. Many offshore users had provided a passport as well as an address when they set up their companies, which made it possible to confirm identities in many but not all cases. Some suspected princelings and officials in the files could not be confirmed and have not been included in this story.
Along with the China and Hong Kong names, ICIJ’s files also include the names of roughly 16,000 offshore clients from Taiwan. ICIJ will continue to publish stories with its partners in the next few days and will release the Greater China names on its Offshore Leaks Database on Jan. 23.
(...)
Κάντε μια έρευνα και για τους δικούς μας, βρε παιδιά, γιατί αν περιμένουμε από την ελληνική Δικαιοσύνη...
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Απάνθισμα από το τελευταίο (σημερινό) Δελτίο Τύπου του Sinocism, του Bill Bishop:
Someone Just Said Something About The Japan-China Conflict That Scared The Crap Out Of Everyone (Business Insider)
I went to one of those fancy private dinners last night in Davos, Switzerland.
(...) The Chinese professional at dinner last night did not seem so much worried about a military conflict as convinced that one was inevitable. And not because of any strategic value of the islands themselves (they're basically worthless), but because China and Japan increasingly hate each other. (...) But then he said that many in China believe that China can accomplish its goals — smacking down Japan, demonstrating its military superiority in the region, and establishing full control over the symbolic islands — with a surgical invasion. In other words, by sending troops onto the islands and planting the flag.
The Chinese professional suggested that this limited strike could be effected without provoking a broader conflict. The strike would have great symbolic value, demonstrating to China, Japan, and the rest of the world who was boss. But it would not be so egregious a move that it would force America and Japan to respond militarily and thus lead to a major war.
[Άλλος δημοσιογράφος στο twitter:] Just interviewed Shinzo Abe @Davos. He said China and Japan now are in a "similar situation" to UK and Germany before 1914.
Και πώς το βλέπουν κάποιοι Αμερικάνοι (και ενδιαφέροντα σχόλια αναγνωστών):
Time to Escalate? Should the U.S. Make China Uncomfortable?
In the January/February issue of Foreign Policy, Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner of the Center for a New American Security argue [their piece] that when the U.S. plays peacemaker it encourages China to raise the stakes, pursuing ever greater levels of adventurism with the confidence that Washington will step in and make sure things don’t get truly out of hand. “China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion by rocking the boat,” they write, “seeing what it can extract in the process and letting the United States worry about righting it.” Instead, they conclude, the U.S. ought to pursue a military and diplomatic strategy that includes lowering its tolerance of provocations at sea, deepening military ties with Japan, and building stronger alliances with other countries in the region “to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing’s calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China.”
Two Thoughts on the Sanger/Shanker Story on NSA Infiltration of Foreign Networks (Lawfare)
the US Government's penetration of Chinese networks revealed in this piece looks a lot like the things the United States has been complaining about the Chinese doing in the United States for years. This implicates an old bugaboo for me – the obviously self-serving hypocrisy in the USG’s high-handed complaints in recent years about Chinese penetration of U.S. networks. The NYT quotes an NSA spokesman drawing the usual distinctions: “We do not use foreign intelligence capabilities to steal the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of — or give intelligence we collect to — U.S. companies to enhance their international competitiveness or increase their bottom line.” But I agree with Peter Singer of Brookings, who is quoted in the story as saying that “[t]he argument is not working . . . To the Chinese, gaining economic advantage is part of national security.” The USG argument is effectively that we want the Chinese to spy on and steal information from us only in the ways we spy on and steal information from them, because the ways we spy on and steal from them, if done to us, won’t cause us as much harm as the espionage and theft strategies that best serve Chinese interests. This obviously self-serving argument is not going to convince anyone outside the United States (...)
Doing stuff, not making stuff (The Economist)
For the first time since 1961, China's production of services (which include transport, wholesaling, retailing, hotels, finance, real estate and scientific research, among other things) exceeded its industrial output (see chart). The new figures meant that China's economy is now primarily based on doing things for people not making things for them. For a country renowned for its industrial clout, this marked a long-awaited turning point.
The income earned from all this production was also distributed a little differently in 2013. The country's official Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality that ranges from zero (when income is evenly distributed) to 1 (when one person takes all), fell ever so slightly to 0.473, continuing a five-year trend of narrowing inequality.
This trend in the official figures is not believed by many Chinese citizens, who are frequently disgusted by the conspicuous consumption of China's wealthy elites. Sceptics suspect that the official bean-counters miss a lot of the shady income that passes through the hands of the flashy rich. Not every household, after all, records their income as scrupulously as Mr Ye does.
But the narrowing of inequality may nonetheless capture something real. China's statistical shortcomings, insofar as they exist, should distort the level of the Gini coefficient more than its trend. And it's also possible that China's resentful citizenry are so preoccupied with rising inequaility within China's metropolises that they ignore the narrowing inequality between its cities and the countryside. In 2009 the disposable income of the average Chinese urbanite was 3.33 times the net income of a rural resident. That ratio has now fallen to 3.03, according to today's NBS figures
The migrants who cross from the countryside to the city are also enjoying healthy gains in wages. Their monthly incomes increased by 13.9% in nominal terms in 2013. These pay hikes may reflect the increase in their bargaining power as China's workforce begins to thin out. The country's population of working age (aged 16-59) fell by 2.44 million in 2013, according to the NBS. Its head noted that many firms report labour costs rising by 10-15%.
H (κυβερνητική) Global Times για τη δίκη του Xu Zhiyong (αβατάρα):
China is speeding up the construction of the rule of law. As for these political activists, they must have a clear vision of the boundary line between politics and law, ensuring that their political advocacies are shown to the public within the rule of law. As far as we are concerned, Xu probably advocated his political views by "gathering crowds," which "disrupted the public order."
It's a misleading thought to forcefully connect Xu's Movement and his trial as cause and effect. Xu's advocacies are a matter of politics and public opinion, not the business of the court. But the court will function if public order is disrupted.
But in actuality, the line between the rule of law and the activists' advocacy is not clearly defined. A "gray zone" is used and expanded by many dissidents, who want to legitimize their advocacy, even some radical political actions. By painting themselves as "democracy fighters," they want to step out of the jurisdiction of the law. Any charges against their violations will be interpreted as "oppression" of democracy.
Xu's case offers an opportunity for Chinese society to demarcate the rule of law. We support Xu to protect his legitimate rights in the court, and meanwhile, we call for the court to strictly comply with the laws disregarding the disruptions from the West.
Chinese society is growing to be more mature than in the old days. This outdated voice, which might call for a severe penalty for Xu after he was caught, has already lost ground in Chinese society. A flexible Chinese society can accept any verdicts given by the court, as long as they are made on the basis of facts and laws.
Και ο "συναγωνιστής" του: (SCMP)
Mainland internet users reacted strongly to news that Wang Gongquan, a venture capitalist and an outspoken civic rights advocate, confessed to disturbing public order in a high-profile case and was released on bail.
(...)
One commenter suggested the ordeal of detention might have played a part in the billionaire's confession. “When a person is detained for than 70 days, with repeated interrogations, sometimes three or four times a day, and he rarely has any contact with the outside world, he could not not sober.”
Wang also made new statements that he would cut ties with Xu, Beijing TV reported.
In December, Wang made video statements to police and said he would "sever the relationship" with Xu, if "that is what the authorities want".
This was a far cry from his statements five months prior, when Wang told the South China Morning Post in July that he had been working to release his friend Xu.
"The more I get involved, the less I fear. I've not broken the law nor do I have bad intentions. Why should I be in fear?" he said at the time.
Hong Kong publisher Yao Wentian, working on Xi Jinping book, held on mainland China (South China Morning Post)
Editor of Morning Bell Press was working with author of book about Xi Jinping when lured to Shenzhen and detained three months ago
Chinese internet users will now be required to register their real names to upload content to Chinese online video sites, an official Communist Party body says (Radio Australia)
Someone Just Said Something About The Japan-China Conflict That Scared The Crap Out Of Everyone (Business Insider)
I went to one of those fancy private dinners last night in Davos, Switzerland.
(...) The Chinese professional at dinner last night did not seem so much worried about a military conflict as convinced that one was inevitable. And not because of any strategic value of the islands themselves (they're basically worthless), but because China and Japan increasingly hate each other. (...) But then he said that many in China believe that China can accomplish its goals — smacking down Japan, demonstrating its military superiority in the region, and establishing full control over the symbolic islands — with a surgical invasion. In other words, by sending troops onto the islands and planting the flag.
The Chinese professional suggested that this limited strike could be effected without provoking a broader conflict. The strike would have great symbolic value, demonstrating to China, Japan, and the rest of the world who was boss. But it would not be so egregious a move that it would force America and Japan to respond militarily and thus lead to a major war.
[Άλλος δημοσιογράφος στο twitter:] Just interviewed Shinzo Abe @Davos. He said China and Japan now are in a "similar situation" to UK and Germany before 1914.
Και πώς το βλέπουν κάποιοι Αμερικάνοι (και ενδιαφέροντα σχόλια αναγνωστών):
Time to Escalate? Should the U.S. Make China Uncomfortable?
In the January/February issue of Foreign Policy, Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner of the Center for a New American Security argue [their piece] that when the U.S. plays peacemaker it encourages China to raise the stakes, pursuing ever greater levels of adventurism with the confidence that Washington will step in and make sure things don’t get truly out of hand. “China is taking advantage of Washington’s risk aversion by rocking the boat,” they write, “seeing what it can extract in the process and letting the United States worry about righting it.” Instead, they conclude, the U.S. ought to pursue a military and diplomatic strategy that includes lowering its tolerance of provocations at sea, deepening military ties with Japan, and building stronger alliances with other countries in the region “to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing’s calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China.”
Two Thoughts on the Sanger/Shanker Story on NSA Infiltration of Foreign Networks (Lawfare)
the US Government's penetration of Chinese networks revealed in this piece looks a lot like the things the United States has been complaining about the Chinese doing in the United States for years. This implicates an old bugaboo for me – the obviously self-serving hypocrisy in the USG’s high-handed complaints in recent years about Chinese penetration of U.S. networks. The NYT quotes an NSA spokesman drawing the usual distinctions: “We do not use foreign intelligence capabilities to steal the trade secrets of foreign companies on behalf of — or give intelligence we collect to — U.S. companies to enhance their international competitiveness or increase their bottom line.” But I agree with Peter Singer of Brookings, who is quoted in the story as saying that “[t]he argument is not working . . . To the Chinese, gaining economic advantage is part of national security.” The USG argument is effectively that we want the Chinese to spy on and steal information from us only in the ways we spy on and steal information from them, because the ways we spy on and steal from them, if done to us, won’t cause us as much harm as the espionage and theft strategies that best serve Chinese interests. This obviously self-serving argument is not going to convince anyone outside the United States (...)
Doing stuff, not making stuff (The Economist)
For the first time since 1961, China's production of services (which include transport, wholesaling, retailing, hotels, finance, real estate and scientific research, among other things) exceeded its industrial output (see chart). The new figures meant that China's economy is now primarily based on doing things for people not making things for them. For a country renowned for its industrial clout, this marked a long-awaited turning point.
The income earned from all this production was also distributed a little differently in 2013. The country's official Gini coefficient, a measure of inequality that ranges from zero (when income is evenly distributed) to 1 (when one person takes all), fell ever so slightly to 0.473, continuing a five-year trend of narrowing inequality.
This trend in the official figures is not believed by many Chinese citizens, who are frequently disgusted by the conspicuous consumption of China's wealthy elites. Sceptics suspect that the official bean-counters miss a lot of the shady income that passes through the hands of the flashy rich. Not every household, after all, records their income as scrupulously as Mr Ye does.
But the narrowing of inequality may nonetheless capture something real. China's statistical shortcomings, insofar as they exist, should distort the level of the Gini coefficient more than its trend. And it's also possible that China's resentful citizenry are so preoccupied with rising inequaility within China's metropolises that they ignore the narrowing inequality between its cities and the countryside. In 2009 the disposable income of the average Chinese urbanite was 3.33 times the net income of a rural resident. That ratio has now fallen to 3.03, according to today's NBS figures
The migrants who cross from the countryside to the city are also enjoying healthy gains in wages. Their monthly incomes increased by 13.9% in nominal terms in 2013. These pay hikes may reflect the increase in their bargaining power as China's workforce begins to thin out. The country's population of working age (aged 16-59) fell by 2.44 million in 2013, according to the NBS. Its head noted that many firms report labour costs rising by 10-15%.
H (κυβερνητική) Global Times για τη δίκη του Xu Zhiyong (αβατάρα):
China is speeding up the construction of the rule of law. As for these political activists, they must have a clear vision of the boundary line between politics and law, ensuring that their political advocacies are shown to the public within the rule of law. As far as we are concerned, Xu probably advocated his political views by "gathering crowds," which "disrupted the public order."
It's a misleading thought to forcefully connect Xu's Movement and his trial as cause and effect. Xu's advocacies are a matter of politics and public opinion, not the business of the court. But the court will function if public order is disrupted.
But in actuality, the line between the rule of law and the activists' advocacy is not clearly defined. A "gray zone" is used and expanded by many dissidents, who want to legitimize their advocacy, even some radical political actions. By painting themselves as "democracy fighters," they want to step out of the jurisdiction of the law. Any charges against their violations will be interpreted as "oppression" of democracy.
Xu's case offers an opportunity for Chinese society to demarcate the rule of law. We support Xu to protect his legitimate rights in the court, and meanwhile, we call for the court to strictly comply with the laws disregarding the disruptions from the West.
Chinese society is growing to be more mature than in the old days. This outdated voice, which might call for a severe penalty for Xu after he was caught, has already lost ground in Chinese society. A flexible Chinese society can accept any verdicts given by the court, as long as they are made on the basis of facts and laws.
Και ο "συναγωνιστής" του: (SCMP)
Mainland internet users reacted strongly to news that Wang Gongquan, a venture capitalist and an outspoken civic rights advocate, confessed to disturbing public order in a high-profile case and was released on bail.
(...)
One commenter suggested the ordeal of detention might have played a part in the billionaire's confession. “When a person is detained for than 70 days, with repeated interrogations, sometimes three or four times a day, and he rarely has any contact with the outside world, he could not not sober.”
Wang also made new statements that he would cut ties with Xu, Beijing TV reported.
In December, Wang made video statements to police and said he would "sever the relationship" with Xu, if "that is what the authorities want".
This was a far cry from his statements five months prior, when Wang told the South China Morning Post in July that he had been working to release his friend Xu.
"The more I get involved, the less I fear. I've not broken the law nor do I have bad intentions. Why should I be in fear?" he said at the time.
Hong Kong publisher Yao Wentian, working on Xi Jinping book, held on mainland China (South China Morning Post)
Editor of Morning Bell Press was working with author of book about Xi Jinping when lured to Shenzhen and detained three months ago
Chinese internet users will now be required to register their real names to upload content to Chinese online video sites, an official Communist Party body says (Radio Australia)
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Δυο-τρία αποσπάσματα από τη δήλωση του Xu Zhiyong στη δίκη του (διάβασε γύρω στα 10 λεπτά και μετά ο δικαστής τον διέκοψε γιατί τα λεγόμενά του "δεν είχαν σχέση με την υπόθεση"), που δίνουν το στίγμα του (δημοκρατικός συνταγματισμός, μεταρρυθμισμός, χριστιανισμός):
(China Change)
Humans are political animals, in need of more than a full stomach and warm clothes. Humans also need freedom, justice, and participation in governance of their own country. You say the National People’s Congress is China’s highest body of power, then again you say this highest body of power answers to the Party. If the country’s basic political system is such an open lie, how is it possible to build a society that values trust?
(…)
Following the Cultural Revolution, China’s economic reforms led to a model of incremental reforms in which social controls were relaxed but the old system and its interests remained untouched, although new spaces created by the market slowly eroded the old system as reforms were laid out.
Political reforms in China could rely on a similar model, one in which the old system and its interests stay in place as social controls are relaxed and democratic spaces outside the system are permitted to grow in a healthy direction. A model such as this would actually prove a valuable path for China to follow.
(…)
Although I possess the means to live a superior life within this system, I feel ashamed of privilege in any form. I choose to stand with the weak and those deprived of their rights, sharing with them the bitter cold of a Beijing winter the way it feels from the street or an underground tunnel, shouldering together the barbaric violence of the black jail.
God created both the poor and the wealthy, but keeps them apart not so we can reject or despise one another, but in order for mutual love to exist, and it was my honor to have the chance to walk alongside petitioners on their long road to justice.
(…)
I now finally accept judgment and purgatory as my fate, because for freedom, justice, and love, the happiness of people everywhere, for the glory of the Lord, all this pain, I am willing.
(…)
Absent a clear direction toward democracy and constitutionalism, even if reforms deepen as promised the most likely result will be to repeat the mistakes made during the late Qing Dynasty, picking and choosing Western practices but not fixing the system. To a large extent, what we see happening around us today is re-enactment of the tragedy of the late Qing reforms, and for that reason I am deeply concerned about the future of the Chinese nation. When hopes of reform are dashed, people will rise up and seek revolution. The privileged and powerful have long transferred their children and wealth overseas; they couldn’t care less of the misfortune and suffering of the disempowered, nor do they care about China’s future. But we do. Someone has to care. Peaceful transition to democracy and constitutionalism is the only path the Chinese nation has to a beautiful future. We lost this opportunity a hundred years ago, and we can’t afford to miss it again today. We, the Chinese people, must decide the future direction for China.
(China Change)
Humans are political animals, in need of more than a full stomach and warm clothes. Humans also need freedom, justice, and participation in governance of their own country. You say the National People’s Congress is China’s highest body of power, then again you say this highest body of power answers to the Party. If the country’s basic political system is such an open lie, how is it possible to build a society that values trust?
(…)
Following the Cultural Revolution, China’s economic reforms led to a model of incremental reforms in which social controls were relaxed but the old system and its interests remained untouched, although new spaces created by the market slowly eroded the old system as reforms were laid out.
Political reforms in China could rely on a similar model, one in which the old system and its interests stay in place as social controls are relaxed and democratic spaces outside the system are permitted to grow in a healthy direction. A model such as this would actually prove a valuable path for China to follow.
(…)
Although I possess the means to live a superior life within this system, I feel ashamed of privilege in any form. I choose to stand with the weak and those deprived of their rights, sharing with them the bitter cold of a Beijing winter the way it feels from the street or an underground tunnel, shouldering together the barbaric violence of the black jail.
God created both the poor and the wealthy, but keeps them apart not so we can reject or despise one another, but in order for mutual love to exist, and it was my honor to have the chance to walk alongside petitioners on their long road to justice.
(…)
I now finally accept judgment and purgatory as my fate, because for freedom, justice, and love, the happiness of people everywhere, for the glory of the Lord, all this pain, I am willing.
(…)
Absent a clear direction toward democracy and constitutionalism, even if reforms deepen as promised the most likely result will be to repeat the mistakes made during the late Qing Dynasty, picking and choosing Western practices but not fixing the system. To a large extent, what we see happening around us today is re-enactment of the tragedy of the late Qing reforms, and for that reason I am deeply concerned about the future of the Chinese nation. When hopes of reform are dashed, people will rise up and seek revolution. The privileged and powerful have long transferred their children and wealth overseas; they couldn’t care less of the misfortune and suffering of the disempowered, nor do they care about China’s future. But we do. Someone has to care. Peaceful transition to democracy and constitutionalism is the only path the Chinese nation has to a beautiful future. We lost this opportunity a hundred years ago, and we can’t afford to miss it again today. We, the Chinese people, must decide the future direction for China.
Costas
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Υποτίθεται ότι θα έφερναν πελάτες (in.gr)
Κακόγουστοι Βούδες ξηλώθηκαν με συνοπτικές διαδικασίες από εστιατόριο
Τοποθέτησαν στην πρόσοψη του εστιατορίου πελώρια αγάλματα του Βούδα να σκαρφαλώνουν από τα τζάμια ή τη στέγη του εστιατορίου. Ήταν όμως τόσο κακόγουστα και προσβλητικά που τα κινεζικά μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πλημμύρισαν από σχόλια και αναφορές εξοργισμένων χρηστών. Τελικά, τα αγάλματα κατέβηκαν με συνοπτικές διαδικασίες.
Η φωτογραφία αξίζει!
Κακόγουστοι Βούδες ξηλώθηκαν με συνοπτικές διαδικασίες από εστιατόριο
Τοποθέτησαν στην πρόσοψη του εστιατορίου πελώρια αγάλματα του Βούδα να σκαρφαλώνουν από τα τζάμια ή τη στέγη του εστιατορίου. Ήταν όμως τόσο κακόγουστα και προσβλητικά που τα κινεζικά μέσα κοινωνικής δικτύωσης πλημμύρισαν από σχόλια και αναφορές εξοργισμένων χρηστών. Τελικά, τα αγάλματα κατέβηκαν με συνοπτικές διαδικασίες.
Η φωτογραφία αξίζει!
bernardina
Moderator
Αυτοί δεν είναι βούδες --βούζες είναι. :cheek:
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Πράγματι!
Ο Xu Zhiyong (Ξ[Σ]υ Τζ-γιόνγκ) [αβατάρα μου] καταδικάστηκε σε 4 χρόνια φυλακή. ΝΥΤ:
China Sentences Legal Activist to 4 Years for Role in Protests
By Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley
BEIJING — A Chinese court sentenced a prominent legal activist to four years in prison Sunday in a case widely seen as a demonstration of the Communist Party leadership’s determination to quell any challenges to its hold on power.
The activist, Xu Zhiyong, was convicted of “gathering a crowd tο disturb public order,” a charge that stemmed from his role organizing a grass-roots New Citizens Movement, which sought to give voice to public discontent over official corruption and social injustice.
After a judge of the No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing announced the guilty verdict and sentence, Mr. Xu denounced the trial as he was led away by guards, said one of Mr. Xu’s lawyers, Zhang Qingfang.
“He said, ‘The court today has completely destroyed what remained of respect for rule of law in China,’ and then he was taken away,” said Mr. Zhang. His account of the verdict and Mr. Xu’s comment was confirmed by the other defense lawyer, Yang Jinzhu.
“He can still appeal, but this outcome was decided by the senior leaders, and there’s no hope of changing the verdict,” Mr. Zhang said. He said the court could have imposed a maximum sentence of five years.
The judgment, coming unusually swiftly after a trial Wednesday, will silence Mr. Xu for now. But the sentence could also enhance Mr. Xu’s prominence as an advocate for political liberalization. Mr. Xu and his two lawyers remained silent in protest for most of the proceedings, but Mr. Xu used his concluding statement to deliver part of an impassioned manifesto for democratic change, free speech and rule of law. The full text has circulated on the Internet.
For the verdict hearing, the police stood guard for blocks around the courthouse, keeping away journalists, diplomats and ordinary citizens concerned about the case. Journalists who tried to approach the court were told to leave.
As the first prosecution of a high-profile activist under Xi Jinping, the Communist Party secretary who took power in November 2012, the case was seen as a barometer of how China’s new leadership — the first in a decade — would respond to organized calls for reform. Some liberal intellectuals and rights advocates initially hoped that Mr. Xi would be more tolerant than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, of mild campaigns for change.
In 2012, Mr. Xu helped promote the New Citizens Movement, an organization that drew up to 5,000 members dedicated to fighting government graft and education policies restricting the children of rural migrants from attending big city schools.
While many of the group’s activities involved informal discussions at restaurants across the country, some of its members took part in small street rallies in 2012 and early 2013 that unnerved the Communist Party leadership.
Prosecutors claimed Mr. Xu was the “ringleader” of several protests in Beijing during which participants held aloft banners denouncing corruption or demanding an end to the nation’s discriminatory education policies.
Other participants in the New Citizens Movement and similar protests also face prosecution, including two who stood trial in the two days after Mr. Xu’s trial. Four others face trial Monday in Beijing, according to Human Rights in China.
Legal experts and human rights advocates described the prosecution of Mr. Xu as deeply flawed. His lawyers were not allowed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, whose testimony was submitted in writing only so they did not appear in court. Nor were the defense lawyers permitted to call in witnesses of their own.
Mr. Xu’s lawyers unsuccessfully challenged the legality of holding separate trials for the New Citizens Movement defendants in Beijing, a move they said prevented them from benefiting from testimony that could help in their defense. Mr. Zhang, one of his lawyers, called the trial last Wednesday “a piece of theater.”
Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch in Hong Kong, said Mr. Xu’s slapdash prosecution and the sentence were designed to deter others seeking to agitate against the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.
“It sends out the message that the law is essentially a tool for the party to rule the citizenry, not for the citizenry to curtail the power of the state,” he said.
---------------------------------------------------------------
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
PRESS RELEASE
26 January 2014
China: Xu Zhiyong four year jail sentence “shameful”
Roseann Rife, East Asia Research Director at Amnesty International, commented:
This is a shameful but sadly predictable verdict. The Chinese authorities have once again opted for the rule of fear over the rule of law. At best the injustice of prosecuting Xu Zhiyong is hypocrisy of the highest order. On the surface his calls to expose corruption coincide with President Xi Jinping’s own much heralded clampdown.
But the message sent from the courtroom today runs far deeper: In Xi Jinping ’s China the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on the political process and anyone that speaks out will be severely dealt with.
The persecution of those associated with the New Citizens Movement demonstrates how fearful the Chinese leadership are of public calls for change. Xu Zhiyong’s calls for justice and accountability are entirely legitimate. He is a prisoner of conscience and he should be released immediately and unconditionally.
Ο Xu Zhiyong (Ξ[Σ]υ Τζ-γιόνγκ) [αβατάρα μου] καταδικάστηκε σε 4 χρόνια φυλακή. ΝΥΤ:
China Sentences Legal Activist to 4 Years for Role in Protests
By Andrew Jacobs and Chris Buckley
BEIJING — A Chinese court sentenced a prominent legal activist to four years in prison Sunday in a case widely seen as a demonstration of the Communist Party leadership’s determination to quell any challenges to its hold on power.
The activist, Xu Zhiyong, was convicted of “gathering a crowd tο disturb public order,” a charge that stemmed from his role organizing a grass-roots New Citizens Movement, which sought to give voice to public discontent over official corruption and social injustice.
After a judge of the No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court in Beijing announced the guilty verdict and sentence, Mr. Xu denounced the trial as he was led away by guards, said one of Mr. Xu’s lawyers, Zhang Qingfang.
“He said, ‘The court today has completely destroyed what remained of respect for rule of law in China,’ and then he was taken away,” said Mr. Zhang. His account of the verdict and Mr. Xu’s comment was confirmed by the other defense lawyer, Yang Jinzhu.
“He can still appeal, but this outcome was decided by the senior leaders, and there’s no hope of changing the verdict,” Mr. Zhang said. He said the court could have imposed a maximum sentence of five years.
The judgment, coming unusually swiftly after a trial Wednesday, will silence Mr. Xu for now. But the sentence could also enhance Mr. Xu’s prominence as an advocate for political liberalization. Mr. Xu and his two lawyers remained silent in protest for most of the proceedings, but Mr. Xu used his concluding statement to deliver part of an impassioned manifesto for democratic change, free speech and rule of law. The full text has circulated on the Internet.
For the verdict hearing, the police stood guard for blocks around the courthouse, keeping away journalists, diplomats and ordinary citizens concerned about the case. Journalists who tried to approach the court were told to leave.
As the first prosecution of a high-profile activist under Xi Jinping, the Communist Party secretary who took power in November 2012, the case was seen as a barometer of how China’s new leadership — the first in a decade — would respond to organized calls for reform. Some liberal intellectuals and rights advocates initially hoped that Mr. Xi would be more tolerant than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, of mild campaigns for change.
In 2012, Mr. Xu helped promote the New Citizens Movement, an organization that drew up to 5,000 members dedicated to fighting government graft and education policies restricting the children of rural migrants from attending big city schools.
While many of the group’s activities involved informal discussions at restaurants across the country, some of its members took part in small street rallies in 2012 and early 2013 that unnerved the Communist Party leadership.
Prosecutors claimed Mr. Xu was the “ringleader” of several protests in Beijing during which participants held aloft banners denouncing corruption or demanding an end to the nation’s discriminatory education policies.
Other participants in the New Citizens Movement and similar protests also face prosecution, including two who stood trial in the two days after Mr. Xu’s trial. Four others face trial Monday in Beijing, according to Human Rights in China.
Legal experts and human rights advocates described the prosecution of Mr. Xu as deeply flawed. His lawyers were not allowed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses, whose testimony was submitted in writing only so they did not appear in court. Nor were the defense lawyers permitted to call in witnesses of their own.
Mr. Xu’s lawyers unsuccessfully challenged the legality of holding separate trials for the New Citizens Movement defendants in Beijing, a move they said prevented them from benefiting from testimony that could help in their defense. Mr. Zhang, one of his lawyers, called the trial last Wednesday “a piece of theater.”
Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher at Human Rights Watch in Hong Kong, said Mr. Xu’s slapdash prosecution and the sentence were designed to deter others seeking to agitate against the Communist Party’s monopoly on power.
“It sends out the message that the law is essentially a tool for the party to rule the citizenry, not for the citizenry to curtail the power of the state,” he said.
---------------------------------------------------------------
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
PRESS RELEASE
26 January 2014
China: Xu Zhiyong four year jail sentence “shameful”
Roseann Rife, East Asia Research Director at Amnesty International, commented:
This is a shameful but sadly predictable verdict. The Chinese authorities have once again opted for the rule of fear over the rule of law. At best the injustice of prosecuting Xu Zhiyong is hypocrisy of the highest order. On the surface his calls to expose corruption coincide with President Xi Jinping’s own much heralded clampdown.
But the message sent from the courtroom today runs far deeper: In Xi Jinping ’s China the Communist Party maintains a monopoly on the political process and anyone that speaks out will be severely dealt with.
The persecution of those associated with the New Citizens Movement demonstrates how fearful the Chinese leadership are of public calls for change. Xu Zhiyong’s calls for justice and accountability are entirely legitimate. He is a prisoner of conscience and he should be released immediately and unconditionally.
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Η ζήτηση για πτερύγιο καρχαρία μειωμένη κατά 70% στην Κίνα. (tweeter) Αξίζει για τη θλιβερή φωτογραφία...
(NBC/Behind the Wall):
The predator seems to be getting a break thanks to the most unexpected of reasons – the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on corruption....με την έννοια ότι σαν αποτέλεσμα έχουν περιοριστεί δραστικά τα λουκούλλεια γεύματα, τα ακριβά ρολόγια, οι προπόσεις μέχρι τελικής πτώσεως με πανάκριβο baijiu, και γενικά αν είσαι αξιωματούχος πρέπει να προσέχεις τον κώλο σου, γιατί οι καιροί είναι πονηροί. Οπότε όλα τα προϊόντα πολυτελείας, κινέζικα και εισαγωγής, έχουν πάθει μεγάλο στραπάτσο. Γι' αυτό και η Global Times (μερικά ποστ πιο πάνω) έγραφε ότι τα θέματα της αγκιτάτσιας του (κατάδικου στο μεταξύ) Xu Zhiyong είναι γνωστά στην κινεζική κοινωνία (υπονοώντας ότι αυτός όμως τα μεταχειρίζεται σαν προκάλυμμα για να περάσει τις μεταρρυθμιστικές του ιδέες, οι οποίες απαγορεύονται βεβαίως ασυζητητί στην πολιτικά κομουνιστική αυτή χώρα). Την εκστρατεία ενάντια στη σκανδαλωδώς χλιδάτη διαβίωση των κρατικοκομματικών αξιωματούχων τη θεωρεί ο πρόεδρος της Κίνας και του ΚΚΚ αγώνα ζωής και θανάτου για το Κόμμα, ο δε αγώνας είναι διμέτωπος: χτυπάμε τα πιο χοντρά συμπτώματα της διαφθοράς στο μηχανισμό ώστε να έχουμε το ηθικό ανάστημα (οΘντκ) να συνεχίσουμε να ασκούμε το νομοθετικά και θεσμικά κατοχυρωμένο μονοπώλιο της εξουσίας, και παράλληλα φυλακίζουμε ό,τι κουνιέται και κλείνουμε τη στρόφιγγα του ίντερνετ, ώστε να γίνει κατανοητό ότι μόνο αφεντικό είναι το κόμμα και ότι μόνο αυτό έχει δικαίωμα "δια να ομιλεί".
(NBC/Behind the Wall):
The predator seems to be getting a break thanks to the most unexpected of reasons – the Chinese Communist Party’s crackdown on corruption....με την έννοια ότι σαν αποτέλεσμα έχουν περιοριστεί δραστικά τα λουκούλλεια γεύματα, τα ακριβά ρολόγια, οι προπόσεις μέχρι τελικής πτώσεως με πανάκριβο baijiu, και γενικά αν είσαι αξιωματούχος πρέπει να προσέχεις τον κώλο σου, γιατί οι καιροί είναι πονηροί. Οπότε όλα τα προϊόντα πολυτελείας, κινέζικα και εισαγωγής, έχουν πάθει μεγάλο στραπάτσο. Γι' αυτό και η Global Times (μερικά ποστ πιο πάνω) έγραφε ότι τα θέματα της αγκιτάτσιας του (κατάδικου στο μεταξύ) Xu Zhiyong είναι γνωστά στην κινεζική κοινωνία (υπονοώντας ότι αυτός όμως τα μεταχειρίζεται σαν προκάλυμμα για να περάσει τις μεταρρυθμιστικές του ιδέες, οι οποίες απαγορεύονται βεβαίως ασυζητητί στην πολιτικά κομουνιστική αυτή χώρα). Την εκστρατεία ενάντια στη σκανδαλωδώς χλιδάτη διαβίωση των κρατικοκομματικών αξιωματούχων τη θεωρεί ο πρόεδρος της Κίνας και του ΚΚΚ αγώνα ζωής και θανάτου για το Κόμμα, ο δε αγώνας είναι διμέτωπος: χτυπάμε τα πιο χοντρά συμπτώματα της διαφθοράς στο μηχανισμό ώστε να έχουμε το ηθικό ανάστημα (οΘντκ) να συνεχίσουμε να ασκούμε το νομοθετικά και θεσμικά κατοχυρωμένο μονοπώλιο της εξουσίας, και παράλληλα φυλακίζουμε ό,τι κουνιέται και κλείνουμε τη στρόφιγγα του ίντερνετ, ώστε να γίνει κατανοητό ότι μόνο αφεντικό είναι το κόμμα και ότι μόνο αυτό έχει δικαίωμα "δια να ομιλεί".
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As China’s Economy Slows, the Pain Hits Home By KEITH BRADSHERJAN. 29, 2014 (NYT)
(...)
China’s steadily strengthening renminbi, persistent inflation and soaring blue-collar wages have combined to erase much or all of the cost advantage of domestic production for a long list of commodities. At the same time, tightened pollution regulations have made it harder for steel mills to use China’s low-grade iron ore reserves or for power plants to burn China’s low-quality coal.
“With the increasing focus on the environment and high costs in some industries in China, China seems to be importing more of the key commodities they need,” said Bruce Diesen, an analyst at the Oslo-based investment bank Carnegie.
Another profound change in Chinese society is also having an impact. Hundreds of millions of Chinese are eating more meat and drinking more milk. The extra animal feed, as well as chicken, beef and dairy products, for that shift is coming increasingly from farms as distant as Uruguay and Argentina. Chinese farms have grown uncompetitive because they tend to be small and inefficient and have a reputation for contaminated food.
Charter rates for bulk freighters, often a good leading indicator of China’s commodity imports, have stayed strong. The shipping industry is betting that even when long-distance freight charges are included, new mines opening in Brazil and Australia will outcompete mines in China.
(...)
(...)
China’s steadily strengthening renminbi, persistent inflation and soaring blue-collar wages have combined to erase much or all of the cost advantage of domestic production for a long list of commodities. At the same time, tightened pollution regulations have made it harder for steel mills to use China’s low-grade iron ore reserves or for power plants to burn China’s low-quality coal.
“With the increasing focus on the environment and high costs in some industries in China, China seems to be importing more of the key commodities they need,” said Bruce Diesen, an analyst at the Oslo-based investment bank Carnegie.
Another profound change in Chinese society is also having an impact. Hundreds of millions of Chinese are eating more meat and drinking more milk. The extra animal feed, as well as chicken, beef and dairy products, for that shift is coming increasingly from farms as distant as Uruguay and Argentina. Chinese farms have grown uncompetitive because they tend to be small and inefficient and have a reputation for contaminated food.
Charter rates for bulk freighters, often a good leading indicator of China’s commodity imports, have stayed strong. The shipping industry is betting that even when long-distance freight charges are included, new mines opening in Brazil and Australia will outcompete mines in China.
(...)
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Γιαπωνέζικα νέα σήμερα, από το newsletter της Asahi Shimbun:
Japan Broadcasting Corp. (NHK) continued to make headlines in the past week due to controversial remarks by some governors at the public broadcaster. Before assuming her governor's post, Michiko Hasegawa, a scholar on comparative ideology, wrote an essay in which she lavished praise on a right-wing activist who shot himself inside the president's office of The Asahi Shimbun 20 years ago. Another governor, writer Naoki Hyakuta, said during speeches supporting a like-minded candidate in the Tokyo gubernatorial election that the Nanking Massacre was a fabrication designed to cancel out U.S. atrocities.
Our coverage of these developments are drawing great global reader attention, given the fact that NHK, Japan's version of the BBC, is required to be a neutral and fair news media outlet.
One of AJW's most-read articles this week was about the Minami-Kyushu municipal government's ongoing bid to have the last letters of kamikaze pilots, often written shortly before they took off for their wartime suicide missions, designated as UNESCO's Memory of the World.
Another NHK governor ignites firestorm with comments on suicidal right-winger
NHK governor campaigns for revisionist in Tokyo election
Writings of kamikaze pilots eyed for UNESCO's Memory of the World
Japan Broadcasting Corp. (NHK) continued to make headlines in the past week due to controversial remarks by some governors at the public broadcaster. Before assuming her governor's post, Michiko Hasegawa, a scholar on comparative ideology, wrote an essay in which she lavished praise on a right-wing activist who shot himself inside the president's office of The Asahi Shimbun 20 years ago. Another governor, writer Naoki Hyakuta, said during speeches supporting a like-minded candidate in the Tokyo gubernatorial election that the Nanking Massacre was a fabrication designed to cancel out U.S. atrocities.
Our coverage of these developments are drawing great global reader attention, given the fact that NHK, Japan's version of the BBC, is required to be a neutral and fair news media outlet.
One of AJW's most-read articles this week was about the Minami-Kyushu municipal government's ongoing bid to have the last letters of kamikaze pilots, often written shortly before they took off for their wartime suicide missions, designated as UNESCO's Memory of the World.
Another NHK governor ignites firestorm with comments on suicidal right-winger
NHK governor campaigns for revisionist in Tokyo election
Writings of kamikaze pilots eyed for UNESCO's Memory of the World
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Ο Xu Zhiyong (Ξ[Σ]υ Τζ-γιόνγκ) άσκησε έφεση. Έχει ενδιαφέρον το κείμενο, που περιγράφει τα καθέκαστα της πρώτης δίκης (China Change). Το λινκ επίσης κάτω-κάτω οδηγεί στον (και μεταφραστικού ενδιαφέροντος για τη σύλληψή του) ιστότοπο China Law Translate, και δίνει το σύνολο της απόφασης του δικαστηρίου (αποδεικτικό υλικό, σκεπτικό, επιμέτρηση ποινής):
Xu Zhiyong submitted an appeal on February 3, 2014, in the Beijing Third Detention Center where he is currently detained. His reasons for appeal are as follows:
I. The court of first instance decided that we had committed the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order;” but we were simply exercising a citizen’s right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by the Constitution, and we were asking that a government organ redress its wrong policy. The site where we gathered is the entrance area of a government organ and its nearby sidewalks, and neither are public places defined by the Criminal Law. According to China’s Criminal Law, the impeding of a government organ’s normal work order can only constitute the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order” or that of “gathering a crowd to assault a State organ,” but not that of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.”
Gathering a crowd on public roads to the extent of impeding residents’ use of it can only constitute the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt transportation order,” not that of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place” either.
Finally, our actions constituted no crime whatsoever because they did not hinder the normal work of either the Ministry of Education or the Beijing Municipal Education Commission, nor did they inconvenience the normal goings and comings of the city residents.
II. The court of first instance decided that we had committed the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order” in Chaoyang Park (朝阳公园), Zhongguancun (中关村) and Xidan Plaza (西单广场); but what we did was simply exercise a citizen’s right to freedom of expression that is guaranteed by the Constitution, and citizens have the constitutional right to call for asset disclosure by officials.
“Public order” is a concrete term, not an abstraction, in the Criminal Law. During the trial, the prosecutors had presented no evidence whatsoever to prove that our actions had infringed upon the legitimate rights of any specific resident or any government unit. The court therefore has no right to decide that these actions of calling officials to disclose assets constituted “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place,” and the court cannot make such a ruling according to an abstract idea that social order was affected.
III. The trial was fraught with outrageous procedural violations. According to the indictment, the action brought against Ding Jiaxi, Zhao Changqing, Li Wei, Yuan Dong, Hou Xin, Zhang Baocheng and me ought to be a necessary joint action, and all of us should be tried as one case. But the court not only separated our case into several cases, and more egregiously, it placed their cases at a lower-level court for trials, thus eliminating the second instance’s ability to correct errors of the first instance and review its decision. After my defense lawyer and I made a strong protest, the presiding judge of the first instance said, to my disbelief, that “though we can’t say it is not problematic to handle it so, we will just have to try the case in the manner the procuratorate made indictments.”
The court of first instance had no legitimate reasons to reject witness requests by my defense lawyer and myself. Since I was denied the right to a fair trial, my defense lawyer and I remained silent during the trial.
This case involves basic civil rights, and citizens should have been allowed to have an audience at the trial according to the law. But the court of first instance arranged, in advance, to have irrelevant people occupy the audience seats while refusing to accept requests by the media and by citizens who really cared about the trial, making it not a real open trial but a black-box operation.
IV. In its decision, the court of first instance erred severely in stating the facts. During the trial, the persecutors presented not one single Beijing resident who alleged his or her legitimate rights had been hindered by the New Citizens Movement activities; testimonies by the prosecutors’ witnesses obviously contravened the video recording of the events; and the court didn’t allow any argument and counterargument. Under such circumstances, the court decided that we had seriously disrupted order in a public place. It is a purely fictitious decision.
To sum up, the decision of the first instance distorted the basic facts and applied the law incorrectly. Spare any talk about rule of law in China if the second instance does not correct the decision of the first instance.
Related:
First-instance verdict in the Xu Zhiyong case. “In the morning of January 26, 2014, the Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court has reached a first-instance verdict in open court concerning the defendant Xu Zhiyong charged with gathering crowds to disrupt order in a public place, confirming Xu Zhiyong has committed the crime of gathering crowds to disrupt order in a public place, and hereby sentences Xu Zhiyong to a fixed term imprisonment of four years.”
Xu Zhiyong submitted an appeal on February 3, 2014, in the Beijing Third Detention Center where he is currently detained. His reasons for appeal are as follows:
I. The court of first instance decided that we had committed the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order;” but we were simply exercising a citizen’s right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed by the Constitution, and we were asking that a government organ redress its wrong policy. The site where we gathered is the entrance area of a government organ and its nearby sidewalks, and neither are public places defined by the Criminal Law. According to China’s Criminal Law, the impeding of a government organ’s normal work order can only constitute the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt social order” or that of “gathering a crowd to assault a State organ,” but not that of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place.”
Gathering a crowd on public roads to the extent of impeding residents’ use of it can only constitute the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt transportation order,” not that of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place” either.
Finally, our actions constituted no crime whatsoever because they did not hinder the normal work of either the Ministry of Education or the Beijing Municipal Education Commission, nor did they inconvenience the normal goings and comings of the city residents.
II. The court of first instance decided that we had committed the offense of “gathering a crowd to disrupt order” in Chaoyang Park (朝阳公园), Zhongguancun (中关村) and Xidan Plaza (西单广场); but what we did was simply exercise a citizen’s right to freedom of expression that is guaranteed by the Constitution, and citizens have the constitutional right to call for asset disclosure by officials.
“Public order” is a concrete term, not an abstraction, in the Criminal Law. During the trial, the prosecutors had presented no evidence whatsoever to prove that our actions had infringed upon the legitimate rights of any specific resident or any government unit. The court therefore has no right to decide that these actions of calling officials to disclose assets constituted “gathering a crowd to disrupt order in a public place,” and the court cannot make such a ruling according to an abstract idea that social order was affected.
III. The trial was fraught with outrageous procedural violations. According to the indictment, the action brought against Ding Jiaxi, Zhao Changqing, Li Wei, Yuan Dong, Hou Xin, Zhang Baocheng and me ought to be a necessary joint action, and all of us should be tried as one case. But the court not only separated our case into several cases, and more egregiously, it placed their cases at a lower-level court for trials, thus eliminating the second instance’s ability to correct errors of the first instance and review its decision. After my defense lawyer and I made a strong protest, the presiding judge of the first instance said, to my disbelief, that “though we can’t say it is not problematic to handle it so, we will just have to try the case in the manner the procuratorate made indictments.”
The court of first instance had no legitimate reasons to reject witness requests by my defense lawyer and myself. Since I was denied the right to a fair trial, my defense lawyer and I remained silent during the trial.
This case involves basic civil rights, and citizens should have been allowed to have an audience at the trial according to the law. But the court of first instance arranged, in advance, to have irrelevant people occupy the audience seats while refusing to accept requests by the media and by citizens who really cared about the trial, making it not a real open trial but a black-box operation.
IV. In its decision, the court of first instance erred severely in stating the facts. During the trial, the persecutors presented not one single Beijing resident who alleged his or her legitimate rights had been hindered by the New Citizens Movement activities; testimonies by the prosecutors’ witnesses obviously contravened the video recording of the events; and the court didn’t allow any argument and counterargument. Under such circumstances, the court decided that we had seriously disrupted order in a public place. It is a purely fictitious decision.
To sum up, the decision of the first instance distorted the basic facts and applied the law incorrectly. Spare any talk about rule of law in China if the second instance does not correct the decision of the first instance.
Related:
First-instance verdict in the Xu Zhiyong case. “In the morning of January 26, 2014, the Beijing Municipal No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court has reached a first-instance verdict in open court concerning the defendant Xu Zhiyong charged with gathering crowds to disrupt order in a public place, confirming Xu Zhiyong has committed the crime of gathering crowds to disrupt order in a public place, and hereby sentences Xu Zhiyong to a fixed term imprisonment of four years.”